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Brief on Behalf of the Commonwealth 
Dixon was convicted of the unlawful transportation 
of ardent spirits in the Circuit Court of Warwick county 
and his punishment fixed by confinement in jail for three 
months and $100 fine. 
THE FACTS. 
Dixon is shown by uncontradicted testimony to have 
had a reputation as a violator of the prohibition law. 
He did not himself transport ardent spirits. The 
charge was transportation, but the evidence shows that 
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the spirits were transported in a Ford V-8 by a man 
named Cliff Turner. The sheriff of York county was 
traveling with J. H. Charles, a special officer of Warwick 
county. They had driven into Warwick county to Har-
per's store and saw Dixon and Turner in separate cars 
going in an opposite direction. They turned and followed 
Dixon and Turner and found 20 gallons of whiskey, 15 · 
in the Turner car and 5 on the side of the road. 
Turner was in the Ford V -8, Dixon following in a Pack-
ard. They had turned off the main road and were driv-
ing on a dirt road. About a half -mile after the two cars 
had turned off they both stopped, the Turner car in front 
and the Dixon car within 15 to 30 feet behind. There 
were two men in each car. Turner was unloading a 
five-gallon jug from his car and was being assisted in 
unloading by Dixon. 
Neither Turner nor Dixon was arrested at the time. 
Turner ran, leaving his car, while Dixon got into his 
Packard, backed back and drove off, making no explana-
tion at the time of his presence upon the scene. 
THE LAW. 
A motion was made to set aside the verdict. This mo-
tion was overruled and exceptions duly taken. The 
motion was based upon the lack of evidence to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that Dixon had any part in the 
transportation of the whiskey, which it is admitted was 
being transported, in Warwick county by Cliff Turner. 
He was tried under the provisions of section 4 of the 
prohibition law, which makes it an offense for one person 
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to unlawfully aid or abet another in doing any act which 
is prohibited by that law, and it is inferentially admitted 
in the argument of petition that Dixon, if guilty of aiding 
or abettng the transportation of whiskey by Turner, was 
correctly convicted, and his punishment was within the 
provisions of the law. . 
There are two assignments of error contained in the 
petition for writ of error. 
The first assignment is based upon the refusal of the 
court to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial on 
the ground that the same was contrary to the law and 
the evidence and without evidence to support it. 
·The second assignment is that the court erred in re-
. fusing to correct the order book to conform with the sen-
tence and punishment actually placed upon the accused 
at the bar of the court (R. p. 4). 
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
Only the first assignment of error is argued in the 
petition. A number of cases are quoted in which this 
court set aside verdicts of juries convicting persons for 
violation of the prohibition law. Each of these cases was 
decided upon the evidence. No two cases are identical 
and this court will consider the facts of the instant case 
without allowing other cases to control, simply applying 
the principle of law .that the evidence in this case is to 
determine the question as to whether the accused has been 
convicted upon evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict 
of the jury and the judgment of the court. 
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It is uncontradicted that Turner was transporting 
whiskey. It is uncontradicted that Dixon with little or 
no reason fell in behind the car that Turner was driving, 
foliowed him on a dirt road without any reasonable ex-
planation as to why he should have followed; that Turner 
stopped alongside this dirt road; that Dixon stopped his 
car just back of the Turner car and alighted; that the 
Turner car contained 20 gallons of whiskey, of which 
cargo Turner had just unloaded a five-gallon bottle or 
keg at the time th_at Sheriff Lawson and Officer Charles 
arrived upon the scene; that Turner immediately ran, 
and that Dixon without offering any explanation got 
into his Packard car, backed back and drove off. 
It is true that Sheriff Lawson testified that, while he 
turned and followed the Turner and Dixon cars, he did 
not see Dixon transporting ardent spirits, but did say 
that he saw Dixon standing by the ardent spirits, mean-
ing, w~ assume, the bottle or the keg which had just been 
unloaded from the Turner car (R. pp. 17-18). 
A diagram was used in the examination of witnesses 
which is not included in the record, so it is impossible for 
counsel to undertake to fix with exactitude just how Tur-
ner and Dixon were standing with reference to the bottle 
of whiskey. On page 19 of the record, the sheriff w~s 
asked on cross-examination to indicate by a circle where 
Dixon was standing when the sheriff reached the scene, 
and he replied that Mr. Dixon was standing about "here" 
(indicating on the sketch), and to the question "He was 
over here?" replied "No, a little closer to the bottle." 
For the purpose of contradicting the witness Charles, 
the stenographic report of the case before the trial jus-
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tice was introduced. Just what is the effect _of the evi-
dence of Mr. Lawson, we do not undertake to say, but 
on page 53 of the record it will be seen, when the sheriff 
was being asked as to Dixon storing, transporting and 
having possession of whiskey, he said that he did not see 
Dixon have a drop of whiskey, but that he s~w him trail-
ing behind the coupe; that he went down and got out of 
the car and was standing by the car of whiskey. When 
the sheriff was asked, "How close was he to this car?" 
he answered, "It was one car towing another." He said 
that Dixon was on the ground and that he had trailed 
the Turner car all the way and until it stopped. 
Officer Charles testified to the same facts as to meet-
ing the two cars and following them back through the 
woods towards Buzzards Roost. He testified, in answer 
to a question who was taking the jug out of the car, 
"Turner was taking the jug out of the car and handing 
it to Dixon to lay-to set it up on the ground." In an-
swer to the question, "Did Dixon put his hand on it at 
all?" replied, "Yes, sir, and set it on the ground." 
Officer Charles was subjected to a long, tedious and 
severe cross-examination, and his testimony that Turner, 
in taking the whiskey bottle out of the Ford, which bottle 
was in a sack, took hold of the sack at the top of the bag 
(R. p. 25), is sought to be impeached by an introduction 
of the stenographic report of his evidence, in which, on 
page 67 of the record, he replied, on re-crossexamina-
tion as to what part of the bag Turner took hold 
of, that he would not say, and to a further question, 
''What part of the bag did Dixon hold?" answered, "I 
could not tell you that." He did testify, however, that 
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the jug and the bag were together and that it was done 
so quick that he could not tell whether he had hold of the 
bottom or the top, he was handling it, taking it down. 
The testimony of Charles that Dixon had hold of the 
bag at the top in the instant case is inconsistent with the 
statement before the trial justice that he could not tell, 
but the weight to be given the te~timony of the witness in 
the trial was a question before the jury; and, further-
more, just how the whiskey bottle in the bag was handled 
was not material. Charles testified in both cases that 
Turner was handing the whiskey out of the car to Dixon, 
who was on the ground, and that Dixon took the whiskey 
and set it on the ground just as the officers came up. The 
difference in the testimony of Charles was as to an im-
material point. Just how the liquor was unloaded does 
not make any difference. The only use to which the in-
consistency of Charles' testimony in the two cases can 
avail appellant is for the weakening of the weight of his 
testimony. The jury has passed upon the credibility of 
Charles and the weight to be given his testimony and has 
found Dixon guilty. This court should not disturb the 
verdict of a jury based upon the question as to the weight 
of evidence unless the evidence is so untrustworthy as to 
be beyond· belief. 
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
The second assignment of error is based upon what is 
said to be refusal of the court to correct the order book 
to conform with the sentence and punishment actually 







There is no evidence to sustain that assignment nor 
does the accused submit even an argument upon the point 
raised in that assignment. 
The verdict of the jury is warranted by the evidence 
and the judgment of the court upon that verdict should 
not be disturbed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
]NO. R. SAUNDERS, 
Attorney General. 
EDWIN H. GIBSON, 
COLLINS DENNY, ]R., 
Assistants Attorney General. 
